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Justice Byron White and the Importance of 
Process 
by CARL TOBIAS 0 
Byron R. White was a twentieth-century Renaissance person. 1 At the 
University of Colorado, White captured honors as the valedictorian and an 
All-American football player. In autumn 1938, he rushed for the greatest 
National Football League yardage. The following semester, White 
attended Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship. He then compiled 
the best academic record in the Yale Law School first-year class and later 
served as a judicial clerk for Chief Justice Frederick Vinson. During 1961, 
President John F. Kennedy named White the Deputy Attorney General 
where he soon thereafter addressed violence inflicted on African-
Americans by desegregation opponents.2 The next year, Kennedy 
characterized White as the "ideal New Frontier judge" when appointing 
him to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the jurist rendered distinguished 
service for three decades. 3 
White exhibited acute sensitivity to process during his exceptional 
career. This essay affords several illustrations of that characteristic. One 
was his perceptive account of the Court's responsibility for amending the 
*Beckley Singleton Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas; Williams Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank Chris 
Bryant, Arthur Hellman, Bruce Markell and Peggy Sanner for invaluable suggestions, Genny 
Schloss for processing and James E. Rogers and Russell Williams for generous, continuing 
support. Errors that remain are mine. 
I. I rely here on DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 
(1998). See also Linda Greenhouse, Byron R. White, Longtime Justice and a Football Legend, 
Dies at 84, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at Al; Gerard Wright, A Modest Jurist's Last Majority, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2002, at A3. 
2. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS 433-35, 453-62 (1988); 
HUTCHINSON, supra note I, at 272-81. See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Athlete As Judge, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 495, 496 (1999). See generally Lance Liebman, A Tribute To Justice Byron R. 
White, l07 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1993). 
3. See, e.g., HUTCHINSON, supra note l, at 335-431; Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Byron 
White's Appointment to the Supreme Court, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 429 (1987). See also Kate 
Stith, Byron R. White, Last of the New Deal Liberals, 103 YALE L.J. 19 (1993). See generally 
Greenhouse, supra note I. 
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rules which mainly govern federal district court practice.4 The second was 
careful stewardship of a federal appellate court study authorized by 
Congress after the jurist had resigned.5 Another was his persistent dissents 
from denials of petitions for Supreme Court review.6 These examples 
relate to the three levels in the federal judicial hierarchy, and demonstrate 
Justice Byron White's abiding concern for each constituent and the whole 
system, as well as his keen appreciation of how valuable process can be. 
I. Amending the Federal District Court Rules: 
The 1993 Civil Rule Revision Proceeding 
In 1993, the Court prescribed arguably the most thorough and 
controversial revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since their 
1938 inception.7 The rule amendment proceeding, which culminated with 
the 1993 civil rules revisions and provided the first major test of nascent 
amendment strictures,8 was extremely contentious. For instance, the 1993 
package imposed mandatory pre-discovery disclosure, an idea the 
organized bar vociferously attacked,9 and a dramatic revision in Rule 11 's 
1983 amendment, 10 which had received greater criticism than any prior 
revision. 11 The 1993 set even provoked an unusual, sharp dissent on the 
4. See infra notes 7-23 and accompanying text. See also Amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 501 (1993) (statement of White, J.) (affording White's 
perceptive rendition). 
5. See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text. See also Retirement of Justice White, 509 
U.S. ix (1993); HUTCHINSON, supra note I, at 432-43; Lewis F. Powell Jr., A Tribute To Justice 
Byron R. White, 107 HARV. L. REV. I (1993); Joan Biskupic, Promises, Pressure in Court 
Search, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1993, at Al. 
6. See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text. 
7. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 401. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) (authorizing 
the federal rule amendment process and prescribing the rule amendment responsibilities of the 
Supreme Court). 
8. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 
4642 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)). See also Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over 
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 
(1991). See generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1599-1600 (1994). 
9. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 431-32. See also id. at 507 (Scalia, J ., dissenting); 
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. I 
(1993); Tobias, supra note 8, at 1611-16; Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 
BROOK. L. REV. 263 (1992). 
IO. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 419-24. See also Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of 
Federal Rule II, 70 IND. L.J. 171 (1994). See generally GEORGENE M. V AIRO, RULE 11 
SANCTIONS (2d ed. 1991). 
11. See Georgene M. Vairo, Rule l I: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 
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merits ofrequiring disclosure and of altering Rule 11. 12 
Justice White crafted a separate statement, which left the 
amendments' substance untreated, but offered revealing perspectives on the 
Court's participation in rule revision since 1962. 13 He cogently explained 
that the Justices promulgate amendments, which the Court "does not itself 
draft and initially propose." 14 Rather, Judicial Conference advisory 
committees, consisting of appellate and trial judges as well as lawyers, 
study the respective Federal Rules and recommend improvements. 15 The 
jurist ascertained that a "sizable majority of the 21 Justices [with whom he 
had served found] Congress intended them to have a rather limited role in 
the rulemaking process." 16 Yet, he and "some" Court members "silently 
shared" the outlook of Justices Hugo Black and William 0. Douglas, who 
often urged that lawmakers assign the Conference responsibility for rule 
revision, pleas which legislators essentially ignored. 17 White also claimed 
most of his colleagues believed they should not "provide another layer of 
review" like the Judicial Conference and the rules committees "for at least 
two reasons": 18 many individuals who served on those entities applied the 
measures daily and could better predict how the changes proffered would 
operate 19 while "the demands of a growing [Court] caseload" and the time 
FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991). See also A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Bench-Bar Proposal to 
Revise Civil Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159 (1991); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485 (1988-89). 
12. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 507 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Clarence Thomas 
joined the entire dissent, while Justice David Souter joined the dissent as to automatic disclosure). 
See generally Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated, 46 FLA. L. REV. 127, 147 n.158 
(1994). 
13. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 50 I (statement of White, J.). See generally Rochelle 
C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L. REV. 9, 23-24 (1994). 
14. For procedures that govern admiralty, appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal and 
evidentiary practice, see Amendments, supra note 4, at 501, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), and 
sources cited supra note 8. 
15. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Evidence reviews the respective committees' 
work, see Amendments, supra note 4, at 501-02, and forwards it to the Conference, the federal 
courts' policymaking arm, see 28 U.S.C. § 331. See generally William W Schwarzer, The 
Federal Judicial Center and the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1129, 1135-42 {1995). 
16. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 503. See generally Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 23-24. 
17. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 503. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994) (providing the 
1934 Rules Enabling Act as amended). 
18. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 504 (statement of White, J.). 
19. See id. Justice White found that trial practice was dynamic and the longer Justices "are 
away from it the less [they] should presume to second-guess the [professional committees') 
careful work." Id. See also id. at 513 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (eschewing the need for expertise to 
review the 1993 changes). 
300 HASTINGS CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY (Vol.30:3 
consumed would "be inconsistent."20 The jurist admonished that the 
Justices "not perform a de novo review and [defer to the] Conference and 
its committees as long as they have some rational basis for their proposed 
amendments,"21 because the Court transmitted to lawmakers revisions 
"without change and without careful study" whenever the committee 
regime apparently functioned well, although he did entertain "serious 
questions about the wisdom of particular proposals to amend certain 
rules."22 White candidly remarked, "it would be a mistake for the bench, 
bar or Congress to assume" the Justices duplicate the conference work; 
"over the years [their] role has been a much more limited one," thereby 
intimating that less Supreme Court process might well be an improvement 
and evidencing the modesty which was his hallmark. 23 
In short, Justice White authored ostensibly the most lucid, frank 
disquisition on the pragmatic realities that accompanied late twentieth-
century procedures for revising the federal rules. The jurist's clear, 
straightforward explication greatly advances comprehension of the specific 
practicalities which attend modern rule amendment, in particular the 
Court's narrowly-confined responsibility for this process. 
II. Studying the Federal Appellate Courts: 
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals 
Soon after Justice White had resigned, a perennial dispute erupted 
when senators who represented most Pacific Northwest states introduced a 
bill which would have divided the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit.24 The debate escalated until the Senate passed a circuit-
20. Id. at 504. The docket has since shrunk. RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 80-
81, 194-95 (2d ed. 1996); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1996). 
21. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 504-05. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 13, at 23-24. 
22. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 505. See also Tobias, supra note 12, at 147 n.160. 
23. See Amendments, supra note 4, at 506. For Justice White's modesty, see HUTCHINSON, 
supra note I, at 1-8. See also DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT 90 (1992) (same); Kenneth Starr, 
Justice Byron R. White: The Last New Dealer, 103 YALE L.J. 37 (1993) (same); Dennis 
Hutchinson, So Much for History, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, at 58 (same). 
24. S. 956, I 04th Cong. (1995). See Arthur D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 MONT. L. REV. 261 (1996). See generally Procter Hug, Jr., 
Introduction, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319 (2000); Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-
Splitting, 44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995); J. Clifford Wallace, The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 941 (1995). 
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splitting appropriations rider in 1997.25 Advocates and opponents of 
bifurcation then created a five-member Commission on Structural 
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals that they accorded twelve 
months to assess the tribunals and compile a report with suggestions for 
improvement, if warranted.26 Supporters of circuit division apparently 
hoped they would derive some advantage from authorizing Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist to select the commissioners; however, he might have 
disappointed the proponents. Rehnquist chose an expert group, composed 
of Justice White and four other members, who seemed to hold few 
preconceptions about the study.27 The jurist graciously accepted the 
crucial, but thankless, assignment of chairing the entity, which was 
henceforth named the White Commission.28 
The jurist, although 80 when appointed, discharged that daunting task 
with considerable energy and finesse. Most Ninth Circuit appellate judges 
strongly opposed bifurcation, even as numerous western senators 
adamantly and publicly championed a split.29 Moreover, the 
commissioners had one year to work, less time than many courts require for 
deciding appeals, 30 which in effect precluded the collection of original 
empirical data. Despite these restraints, White vigorously chaired that 
25. See S. Res. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305(b)(2) (1997) (enacted); 143 CONG. REC. S8041 
(daily ed. July 24, 1997). See also Procter Hug, Jr., The Ninth Circuit Should Not Be Split, 57 
MONT. L. REV. 291 (1996); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 
49 FLA. L. REV. 189, 212 (1997). 
26. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997). See also Arthur D. 
Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 377, 378-81 (2000); Tobias, supra note 25, at 192-214. See generally 
Thomas E. Baker, A Generation Spent Studying the United States Courts of Appeals, A 
Chronology, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 395 (2000). 
27. There were two federal appellate judges, one federal district judge and a past president 
of the American Bar Association. See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal 
Courts of Appeals, Final Report I, 92 ( 1998) [hereinafter Commission Report]. See also Pamela 
Ann Rymer, How Big ls Too Big?, 15 J.L. & POL. 383 (1999); Carl Tobias, The Federal Appeals 
Courts at Century's End, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 549, 554 (2000). 
28. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 26; Pamela Ann Rymer, Implications of the White 
Commission, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 351 (2000). See generally Commission Report, supra note 
27, at I; Carl Tobias, A Divisional Arrangement for the Federal Appeals Courts, 43 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 633, 636 (2001). 
29. See, e.g., Commission Report, supra note 27, at 33, 37-38; Procter Hug, Jr., The 
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals' Final Report: An 
Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
887 (1999). But see Rymer, supra note 27. 
30. See Act of Nov. 26, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2440, 2491-92 (1997);. 
See also Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Working 
Papers 95, tbl. 7 (1998) [hereinafter Working Papers] (affording the appeals courts' disposition 
times). All of the commission members, except Justice White, were otherwise discharging full-
time responsibilities for resolving or trying cases. 
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effort and exercised sound judgment. He and the Commission attempted to 
maximize public participation in their endeavor. For example, the 
commissioners assiduously solicited citizen input through written 
submissions and at six hearings conducted across the nation31 as well as 
widely circulated a draft report on which the members received extensive 
commentary that they reviewed in assembling a final report and 
recommendations. 32 The centerpiece of the Commission proposals was a 
mandatory divisional arrangement for the Ninth Circuit and optional 
divisions, which the remaining appellate courts might adopt as they grew 
over time. 33 That novel concept proved somewhat controversial, and it 
received relatively little consideration after senators sponsored a bill which 
embodied the idea during 1999.34 The approach was quite creative, albeit 
problematic, and serious restrictions would attend treatment of such a 
highly-charged political dispute with any notion that promised to transform 
century-old institutions so fundamentally. 
Therefore, although the final product developed by the commissioners 
evoked criticism, numerous limitations, including the truncated timeframe 
and the venerable traditions of circuit structure and operations, severely 
circumscribed what the Commission could attain. One measure of these 
restraints and of the jurist's humility may be that the "[c]ommission said 
nothing about unresolved intercircuit conflicts," a concern which he had 
explicitly and powerfully voiced during his long tenure35 that I analyze 
below. 
31. See Commission Report, supra note 27, at 2-3. See also Rymer, supra note 27; Tobias, 
supra note 28, at 636-37. See generally Carl Tobias, Dear Justice White, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127 
(1998). 
32. See Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Tentative 
Draft Report (1998). See generally Commission Report, supra note 27, at 4; Tobias, supra note 
28, at 637-38. 
33. See Commission Report, supra note 27, at 40-52, 93-99. See also John B. Oakley, 
Comparative Analysis of Alternative Plans for the Divisional Organization of the Ninth Circuit, 
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483 (2000). See generally Hellman, supra note 26, at 381-93; Hug, supra 
note 29; Procter Hug, Jr., & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1657 (2000); Rymer, supra note 28. 
34. See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Tobias, supra note 28. A Ninth Circuit 
Evaluation Committee also proffered numerous suggestions that the appeals court implemented. 
See Ninth Circuit Evaluation Committee, Interim Report (Mar. 2000). See also Hug & Tobias, 
supra note 33; David R. Thompson, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Evaluation Committee, 
34 U.C. DA VIS L. REV. 365 (2000). 
35. See Arthur D. Hellman, Never The Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology 
of lntercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. Pm. L. REV. 81, 86-87 (2001). See also supra note 23 and 
accompanying text (documenting his humility). When planning the study, White convened six 
legal scholars and asked them cogent questions premised on his half-century experience. See 
Commission Report, supra note 27, at 100. 
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III. Granting Supreme Court Review: 
Dissents from Denial of Requests for Review 
Over the last two decades that Justice White served, the jurist wrote 
hundreds of statements dissenting from Supreme Court decisions which 
refused petitions for review.36 White apparently published the "dissents 
from denial" because he thought the Justices did not fulfill their 
constitutional responsibilities when the Court permitted diverse "legal rules 
on federal issues to exist in different jurisdictions throughout the 
country."37 
A number of these dissents were terse, essentially noting that the 
regional circuits had reached divergent substantive or procedural 
conclusions and admonishing his colleagues to reconcile the 
inconsistencies which had arisen.38 The laconic nature of White's 
treatment is justifiable partly because elaboration was not warranted and 
because he could file 70 such determinations in a single term.39 On one 
day in 1989, White contended that the Justices should have heard 13 cases 
denied certiorari and clarified the disagreements.40 
The jurist wrote additional dissents from denial of certiorari, which 
were comparatively expansive.41 For instance, after several appellate 
courts enunciated inconsistent standards governing judicial scrutiny of 
federal administrative agency decisions not to prepare environmental 
36. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 1, at 400-01. See generally POSNER, supra note 20, at 80-
81, 194-95; Kevin Worthen, Shirt-Ta/es: Clerking for Byron White, BYU L. REV. 349, 354-55 
(1994). 
37. HUTCHINSON, supra note I, at 400. See generally sources cited supra note 36 and infra 
note 47. 
38. See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 493 U.S. 906 (1989) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); Messino v. United States, 479 U.S. 939 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
39. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1039 (1990) (White, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (remarking on his "dissent from denial of certiorari sixty-seven times 
during this Term"); Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S. 913, 915 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (noting his dissent from denial of certiorari "almost 200 times in the past 
three Terms"); Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved 
Circuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693, 715 (1995) (ascertaining that Justice White dissented 
from denial of certiorari in 23 7 appeals during the 1988, 1989 and 1990 Terms). 
40. See McMonagle v. Northeast Women's Ctr., 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (White, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). See generally Hellman, supra note 35, at 93-94; Hellman, supra note 
39, at 705-06. 
41. See Petty Motor Co. v. United States, 475 U.S. 1056 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari); Davis v. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 475 
U.S. 1057 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also supra note 40 and 
accompanying text. 
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impact statements, White urged that his colleagues entertain the matter and 
rectify or ameliorate the disuniformity.42 He elaborated: "Because this 
conflict among the Circuits raises a significant question as to the proper 
interpretation of a federal statute, because this question recurs regularly, 
and because I believe that the issue is not merely one of semantics, I would 
grant certiorari to resolve the issue. "43 
White expressly articulated why he published dissenting statements on 
occasion. For example, in 1988 the Justice explained the "principal 
reason" was that the Court had not discharged its "special obligation to 
intercede and provide some definitive resolution" of issues over which the 
federal and state courts have divided.44 During 1990, White registered 
analogous concerns about inconsistently administering federal law "in 
different parts of the country [and exposing] citizens in some circuits [to 
liabilities or affording them] entitlements that citizens in other circuits are 
not burdened with or entitled to," while the jurist argued the situation 
"merits the attention of Congress and the legal establishment.''45 White 
aptly summarized the perspectives espoused over 20 years when the Justice 
penned almost his final dissent from denial: 
One of the Court's duties is to do its best to see that the federal law is 
not being applied differently in the various circuits around the 
country. The Court is surely not doing its best when it denies 
certiorari in this case, which presents an issue on which the Courts of 
Appeals are recurringly at odds. I would grant certiorari.46 
42. See River Rd. Alliance v. Corps ofEng'rs, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) 
(dissenting from denial of certiorari and noting the Court's previous denial of certiorari in a case 
involving the same issue in Gee v. Boyd, 4 71 U.S. 1058, 1059 ( 1985) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari)). 
43. River Rd. Alliance, 475 U.S. at 1056 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
See also Michael Broyde, Note, The lntercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis of 
Justice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
610, 628 (1987) (finding denial proper because the conflict was irrelevant to petitioner who 
would have lost under either standard). 
44. Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S. 913, 915 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
45. Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038, 1039-40 (1990) (White, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). Illustrative are the cases involving law school admissions. See Smith v. 
Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); 
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). See also Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), ajf'd 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). 
46. Taylor v. United States, 504 U.S. 991 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). For cogent explanations of why Justice John Paul Stevens "resisted the temptation to 
publish" dissents from denial, see Singleton v. Comm 'r of Internal Revenue, 439 U.S. 940, 942 
(1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). Accord Castorr v. Brundage, 459 U.S. 928 
(1982); Chevron v. Sheffield, 471 U.S. 1140 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of 
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The jurist's dissenting remarks, thus, attest to the importance he 
accorded the maintenance of uniform national law.47 They also reflect a 
less grandiose, and perhaps more appropriate, conceptualization of the 
Supreme Court's role in modem American society than a contemporary 
High Court majority seems to possess.48 
IV. Conclusion 
Supreme Court Justice Byron White exhibited striking awareness of 
how critical process is at each level in the federal judiciary and for the 
system. The jurist's candid, astute observations on High Court 
responsibility for amending rules that principally cover district court 
practice; energetic, fair leadership of an appellate court study which 
attempted to maximize public input; and numerous dissents from denials of 
petitions that invoked Supreme Court jurisdiction are salient reminders of 
process's significance and of his dedicated public service.49 
certiorari). For a valuable response to the views that Justice Stevens articulated, see Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542-44 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
47. Some wonder how much inconsistency exists and whether it is problematic, while the 
Court now reviews fewer cases. See supra note 20; Broyde, supra note 43; Hellman, supra note 
35; Hellman, supra note 39. These ideas may seem to discredit White's views, but he did 
provoke empirical study, while the shrunken docket is controversial and is exacerbated because 
appeals courts publish opinions in 23% of cases and most courts limit citation of the remainder. 
See Working Papers, supra note 30, at 110-13. 
48. A majority evinces less concern about the maintenance of consistent national law and 
about the federal judiciary as a unified system. See Hellman, supra note 20. Some Supreme 
Court determinations also seem more legislative than judicial, which can undermine legitimacy 
and credibility. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The Justices also invalidate federal 
statutes, eviscerate Congress's power and impose unwarranted, onerous demands on its 
lawmaking. See Christopher Bryant & Timothy Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme 
Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
328 (2001); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); 
Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The Congressional Process and the 
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L. J. 1707 (2002). 
49. "[D]uring 31 years on the Court, he excelled in his service to it, the Constitution and the 
Nation." Accord HUTCHINSON, supra note l; Liebman, supra note 2; Powell, supra note 5; Stith, 
supra note 3. See Louis F. Oberdorf er, Justice White and the Yale Legal Realists, 103 YALE L. J. 
5, 17 (1993). 
